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ing buyer will trade." Id. Without this evidence of value, the jury's verdict would
not be based on articulable objective
facts. Even though the owner testified she
originally had paid $750.00 for the property and the accused (certainly not a willing buyer) paid $100.00 to repurchase
the television set, neither purchases were
indicative of fair market value.
The Court stated that the only departure from the strict rule of proof would be
where the "stolen property (1) had been
recently purchased at a price well in excess of $100.00; (2) was in 'mint condition' at the time of the theft; and (3) was
not subject to 'prompt depreCiation or obsolescence.' " 376 A.2d at 444.
The government's proof was thus sufficient to sustain a conviction only for petit
larceny, a misdemeanor. With this charge,
all that is necessary is for the government
to show that the stolen items had value.
The Court closed with an oblique
reference to what may be poor trial preparation on the part of the U.S. Attorney's
Office. It noted, at 376 A.2d 444 n. 3,
that there has been "a continuing indication of failure in governmental proof sufficient to establish a felony rather than a
misdemeanor in larceny cases of this
nature."

Merger
Doctrine
Examined
by John Jeffrey Ross

On July 13, 1974, a young woman was
allegedly raped in the District of Columbia. This event provoked a search by her
relatives and friends for some neighborhood justice. Mrs. Mary Harris, grandmother of the assault victim, accompanied
this crowd of vigilantes to a Washington
home wherein the rapist was thought to
reside. As two men from the group forced
their way through the front door they shot
down an innocent third party, Louis
Sisler, who tried to prevent their entry.
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Sisler died at an emergency room
shortly thereafter, but not before he provided, by way of admissible "spontaneous
utterances," testimony leading to the
murder and burglary convictions of the
assailants. See Harris v. United States,
373 A.2d 590 (D.C. App. 1977).
The tragiC events of that day have led
to further prosecutions, and the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals has recently
adjudicated the appeal of Mrs. Harris from
her convictions for conspiracy to commit
assault with a dangerous weapon, attempted first degree burglary while
armed, and felony murder. Mrs. Harris
had been brought to justice for her role in
aiding and abetting the forcible entry of
the murder victim's home and his shooting. Harris v. United States, 377 A.2d 34
(D.C. App. 1977).
On appeal, Mrs. Harris claimed that the
trial court erroneously resolved the
follOWing issues against her:

cerning accomplice guilt, the court saw as
dispositive numerous actions by Mrs. Harris indicative of her role as a motivating
force in the group's search for revenge
which led it to the scene. The court rejected her claim that her leaving the scene
prior to the murder was sufficient to avoid
criminal liability.
The court reasoned that absent an affirmative move to "disavow or defeat" the
criminal purpose, or "definite decisive"
steps shOWing complete abandonment of
the illegal undertaking, the departure was
ruled insufficient "as a matter of law" to
show withdrawal from the criminal enterprise. Id., at 38.
As to HarriS' liability in the felony
murder, the court stated that the killing
was within the scope of the burglary perpetrated by Harris and her prinCipals; a
natural and probable consequence of, and
not merely "coincident" to, the illegal en-

She further complained that the
offenses upon which the felony murder accusation was based should have been
merged with the homiCide, thus removing
support for the first degree murder conviction.

try. 377 A.2d at 37-38.
On the failure of the trial court to impanel, sua sponte, a second jury to hear
her insanity defense or to question veniremen of the present panel to determine
prejudice against this defense, the court
stated that Harris had abruptly changed
her defense tactics at trial by an untimely
assertion of the insanity defense; there
was no right to a second jury, and that absent a timely request by counsel for voir
dire on the insanity issue, the trial judge
did not abuse her discretion in the manner
in which she conducted the trial. Also
fatal to the appellant's claim was the absence of objection to the "manner and
method" of the court's use of the jury.
In addition, the court dismissed claims
that the prosecutor made statements of
such import as to prejudice the defense. It
was held that proper jury instructions
remedied their effect, and that a fair trial
was preserved. 377 A.2d at 39-40.

The court affirmed the convictions, indicating by a recital of the group's purposeful actions that the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the
government, clearly showed criminal
animus for revenge and armed, forcible
entry into the victim's home-thus sufficient evidence for attempted first degree
burglary while armed. [d., at 36-37. Con-

The final issue to be considered was
Mrs. Harris' claim that the felony murder
conviction must be reversed because the
offenses on which the felony murder was
based should have been merged into that
homicide as lesser included offenses. In
other words, she contended that 1) the
burglary was based upon the intent to
commit assault with a dangerous weapon;

'SuffiCiency of the evidence to sustain
accomplice guilt for attempted first
degree burglary;
2statements by the decedent admitted
against her;
3sufficiency of the evidence to show accomplice guilt for the first degree
felony murder;
4 refusal by the trial court to impanel,
sua sponte, a second jury to hear Mrs.
Harris' untimely insanity defense or to
conduct a voir dire of the jurors to
determine prejudice against such a
defense;
5 prejudical statements by the prosecutor concerning Mrs. Harris' insanity
defense, even though the trial court
provided instructions to mitigate their
impact.

2) the assault, with elements common to
the homicide, must be merged with it; and
3) there being no underlying separate
felony, there was no felony murder. The
defense thus read the facts as showing an
intent to enter the home solely to assault
Sisler, i.e. one continuous criminal transaction from entry to homicide.
The doctrine of merger, where not
abrogated by statute, is applicable so that
an accused will not face "double punishment" for one act. At common law, the
rule was given effect where the same act
generated more than one offense. Klein v.
State, 151 Md. 484, 135 A.591 (1926);
MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw, 50 (1934); CLARK AND
MARSHALL, CRIMES, § 2.03 (7th Ed. 1968).
The defense theory in Harris failed for
three basic reasons. First, the burglary
was a distinct offense committed for the
demonstrated purpose of finding ·an individual the attackers thought was other
than the murder victim. See Harris v.
United States, 373 A.2d 590, 593 n. 8.
This intent to enter to find the "third party" gave the burglary a specificity apart
from the homicide--an element of intent
separate from the killing. Second, 22 D.C.
Code § 2401 proscribes as felony murder
a killing in any housebreaking. Third,
"[T] he societal interest served by the
burglary statute [22 D.C. Code § 1801],
protection of occupied dwellings, is separate and distinct from that of the murder
statute, security and value of the person."
377 A.2d at 38.
As the Court of Appeals stated in a case
clearly on point:
[Defendant] committed burglary by
knowingly entering [victim's] home
with the intent to assault him. Having
committed the burglary and violated
the appurtenant societal interests, it
was still possible for [defendant] and
his companions to withdraw from the
premises without attacking [the victim]. But continuation of this criminal
conduct resulted in the death. . . and
the commission of a second distinct
crime.

rea and actus reus, to the immediate parties, i.e. no intent was shown to enter for a
purpose other than to kill the immediate
victim. An even stronger case against
merger is thus found in Harris where there
are indicia of two separate criminal purposes.

In this case, where the homicide is ancillary to the attempted burglary, the
following observation is appropriate:
It is said that if [the accused] arms himself with the intent to shoot anyone
who interferes with the commission of
the burglary, he is chargeable with such
premeditation as to render him guilty
of murder in the first degree.

1 WARREN ON HOMICIDE § 74 at 332 (1938).

Ancient
Decisions
by Robert C. Becker

There it is, volume one, number one. It
is all done in one paragraph and about
one-quarter of the page. Still it is the first
reported case in United States jurisprudence.
In days when Maryland was more freely
dispensed than it is today, one William
Boreman filed a preliminary claim to four
hundred acres at Nanjemoy. Charles
County people take note. He had the
ground surveyed, occupied it, and considered it his own. He failed, however, to
perfect a patent to his land within the time
specified in the original warrant.

Meantime, Captain William Stone, apparently realizing the defect in Boreman's
claim, filed and perfected a patent to the
same land. When Captain Stone undertook to occupy land then his, dispute
naturally arose. It came to the attention of
the provincial court. Stone v. Boreman 1
H & McH 1 (1658).
The court held that Boreman had lost
his claim by failing timely to perfect his
patent. Stone was the rightful owner of
the land in question. Boreman was still
entitled to four hundred acres and might
have it elsewhere in a "convenient place."
[d. at 2. Basic equity is affordable where
land is plentif~l.
The interesting part of this rather short
report concerns the treatment of the surveyor who laid out Boreman's original
claim. The court seems to hold that he
should have known of the fault in Boreman's filing and should have either
warned him of it or simply refrained from
the commission. At any rate he is held
responsible for surveying, without charge,
such new claim as Boreman shall take and
perfect.
This is a decision hardly possible in today's circumstances. Land is not granted
four hundred acres at a time; rather it is
bitterly litigated by the foot. It is necessarily the product of an era when royal
charters were framed in terms of latitudes
north and south to the setting of the sun.
Still, it is a decison embodying the virtues
of brevity and fairness, criteria we yet
strive to meet.
An Afternoon Spent Browsing in the
Dusty Section of a Small Law Library
1 Harris & McHenry (1658)

Biango v. United States, 373 A.2d 885,
888 (D:C. App. 1977).

The court in Biango found that a conviction for felony murder was appropriate
for policy reasons even where the criminal
event was isolated, in terms of both mens
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